It is commonly believed that a monetary policy that targets the price level reduces the long-term variability of the price level but only at the cost of increased variability in both inflation and output. This paper shows that this result may not hold so long as increases in the real rate of interest cause decreases in aggregate demand. In particular it is shown that the one-step-ahead variance of output and inflation are lower under price-level targeting than under inflation targeting. Further, it is shown that the variance of inflation about its target value can be lower under price-level targeting than under inflation targeting. This increased stability under price level targeting works through an interest rate channel not previously identified in the literature on price-level and inflation targeting. 
Introduction
Most central banks operate under the twin goals of price and output stability with price stability defined as a low and stable inflation rate somewhere between 2% and 3% per year. 1 There are two ways, however, to achieve an average inflation rate of 3%. Under what is called inflation targeting, even if the target rate is missed during the current period, the target remains at 3% for all future periods. Under what is called price-level targeting, the long-run path of the expected price level is pre-determined. 2 Thus, if inflation is 4% during the current period, the inflation target during the next period is reduced to 2% in order to restore the price level to its target growth path. In contrast, under inflation targeting, anytime the realized price level differs from its expected value, there is a new long-run path for the expected price level. 3 
This paper shows that this difference between price-level targeting and inflation targeting
is sufficient to cause price-level targeting to be superior to inflation targeting as long as expectations are rational and the demand for output increases as the real rate of interest declines.
The reason for this result is straightforward. Under price-level targeting, whenever the realized price level is above its expected value, expected inflation declines, raising the real rate of interest. This reduces aggregate demand, thereby reducing the size of the unexpected change in the price level. This, it turns out, always reduces the variation of output around its full information value and the variation of the price level around its target value. That is, price-level targeting provides the economy with a form of built-in stability not provided by inflation targeting.
The argument of this paper is important because it is widely believed that the only advantage of price level targeting over inflation targeting is the former's ability to provide a greater degree of price-level stability in the long run. According to Svensson (1999) , the emerging conventional wisdom is that this advantage comes "at the cost of increased short-term variability of inflation and output." 4 But in the model presented below, price-level targeting always results in a greater level of output stability than inflation targeting. Further, it is possible for the variability of inflation also to be lower under price level targeting than under inflation targeting.
The relative benefits of price-level targeting demonstrated below depend upon the effect of price-level targeting on the behavior of aggregate demand. Therefore, as the graphical presentation in section 5 below makes clear, the results derived below do not depend upon why the short-run aggregate supply curve is upward sloping. In particular the results derived below hold not only if the Phillips curve is neo-classical, but also if it is New-Keynesian. 5 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses some of the recent literature on the choice between price-level and inflation targeting. Section 3 presents the model, while section 4 presents solutions to the model, first under inflation targeting and then under price level targeting. A comparison of the solutions shows that price-level targeting provides greater output and price stability. Section 5 presents a graphical explanation of the results which is straightforward enough to use in an intermediate level macroeconomics
classroom. Finally, section 6 offers a summary and some conclusions. Bernanke et al. (1999, p. 10) state that the case for targeting the rate of inflation rests on three arguments. The first argument is that the inflation rate is the only economic variable that the monetary authority can control in the long run. That is, setting a low rate of inflation as the primary long-run goal of monetary policy reflects an acceptance of reality rather than a lack of concern over other economic problems (such as unemployment). The second argument is the belief that even moderate rates of inflation tend to reduce economic efficiency. Hence policy makers who target inflation believe that maintaining a low and relatively stable rate of inflation is a necessary condition for the achievement of their other macroeconomic goals. Finally, the third argument is that an inflation target imposes the necessary discipline on the central bank that allows financial markets and the public at large to form their expectations with a greater degree of certainty than otherwise. , responding in part to the working paper version of Svensson (1999) , argues that Svensson's results depend upon the specification of his aggregate supply curve. Simulations of small scale macroeconomic models (such as those mentioned in footnote 4, above) find that price-level targeting is inferior to inflation targeting regarding output stability because these models employ New-Keynesian Phillips curves. The implication is that Svensson (1999) finds that price-level targeting can produce a lower inflation variance than inflation targeting (with output variances being equal) only because his model employs a neo-classical Phillips curve. Dittmar and Gavin (2000) show that Kiley's argument is incorrect. Rather they find that pricelevel targeting performs better than inflation targeting in an economy with a New-Keynesian Phillips curve.
Previous Literature
Why then, does Svensson find that price-level targeting can result in a lower variance of inflation than inflation targeting? 6 The main factor driving his result is the assumption that the central bank does not adjust its output target over time, even though output deviations are known to be persistent. If output y t is above its target (taken here to be 0) during the current period, then in the absence of time t+1 supply shocks Svensson's aggregate supply curve implies that y t+1 =ρy t . This is because in the absence of such a shock, the private sector perfectly anticipates time t+1 central bank behavior causing actual and expected inflation to coincide. Thus, although rational expectations dictate y t+1 =ρy t in the absence of future shocks, the central bank's goal is y t+1 =0. 7 It is the attempt of the central bank to achieve an output target of 0 when output persistence and rational expectations dictate otherwise that drives Svensson's results on inflation variance in the two regimes.
In pointing to the role of output persistence, Svensson has identified one important mechanism that can make price-level targeting superior to inflation targeting. This paper identifies a separate mechanism that does not depend upon the existence of output persistence, hence output persistence is dropped from the model. The dropping of output persistence allows us to maintain a relatively simple model while further developing the role of aggregate demand.
In particular, we incorporate the role of the interest rate in aggregate demand and model a central Svensson finds that inflation variance is always lower under inflation targeting, while we find an ambiguous comparison. Thus, if the mechanism in our paper is considered in addition to
Svensson's, the case that inflation variance can be lower under price level targeting is strengthened considerably.
The Model
The model developed below utilizes a Lucas (1972) aggregate supply curve under which aggregate supply is positively related to innovations in the price level. We impose rational expectations in order to solve this model. The aggregate demand relationship is derived from the goods market clearing (IS) and money market (LM) clearing conditions. In a recent paper McCallum and Nelson (1999) defend the use of the IS-LM model and argue that it can be made consistent with micro foundations. Although their approach results in an IS curve that includes the expected future value of output, since our model has a constant expected future value of output, such a term is subsumed into the constant, a in equation (1) Our goal is to analyze the effects of price targeting in a simple, yet reasonable model. The simplicity of the model allows us to derive analytical solutions and to make a full economic interpretation of our results. Furthermore, the crucial feature of aggregate demand in our model is that it is decreasing in the real interest rate. This is a reasonable property that survives in more complex settings.
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The basic model consists of the following three equations.
IS:
LM:
AS:
Time subscripts are denoted by t. Equation (1) is an IS curve that states that output demand decreases as the real interest rate increases. Equation (2) is a portfolio equilibrium condition or LM curve that states real money balances demanded increase as output demanded increases and as the nominal rate of interest decreases. Equation (3) is an expectations augmented aggregate supply curve. As γ in equation (3) approaches zero, the aggregate supply curve becomes vertical and the model approaches a real business cycle model. On the other hand, as γ increases without bound, the aggregate supply curve becomes very flat and the model approaches a Keynesian model in which unexpected fluctuations in aggregate demand affect output with practically no effect on the price level.
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The model is closed by assuming that monetary policy is implemented in a manner that minimizes the monetary authority's loss function. Here the loss function is assumed to be 10 Loss : The output target at time t is given by
This target reflects the contemporaneous supply shock. To the extent that supply shocks reflect real productivity shocks, economic theory suggests that we should not attempt to stabilize against them. Thus, our specification for the output target would appear to be valid in a normative context. Whether it explains actual central bank objectives is less clear, but as we explain below, the positive implications of our model are robust to the alternative assumption that the output target is constant at c.
We assume that the monetary authority implements policy in the following way. At the beginning of any period, t, it chooses the nominal rate of interest, R t , which minimizes the expected value of (4). Once chosen, the rate of interest is not changed until the beginning of the next period. Thus, the monetary authority acts prior to observing the current period's shock. The graphical discussion in section 5, below, makes it clear that the results do not depend on the assumption that the monetary authority pegs the rate of interest.
The model's solution

Solution under inflation targeting.
Under 
If we define y _ t to be c+ ε 3,t , then using (3), the loss function becomes
Applying the expectations operator to (6), conditional on information available during period t,
While noting the dependence of p t+1 on R t+1 , take the first derivative of (7) 
Taking the derivative of this expected loss function with respect to R t and setting the result equal to 0 yields
Insert (8) into (1) to obtain
At the beginning of period t, the monetary authority will choose the rate of interest that causes expected output, E t-1 y t , to equal c. Note that output depends upon the IS shock, but not the LM or aggregate supply shock. This reflects the fact that interest rate targeting by the central bank causes the aggregate demand curve to be vertical. Inserting (9) into (3) and solving for the price level yields
Solution under price-level targeting.
Price-level targeting is assumed to take the following form:
Subtracting p t-1 from both sides of (11) yields
According to equation (11) there is a predetermined path of prices that the monetary authority is targeting. If π _ > 0, this implies that the price level target is trending upward over time. Thus, price level targeting is consistent with a positive average rate of inflation. As is shown by equation (12), if the price level is below its target during period t-1, the target rate of inflation during period t is above π _ . Similarly, if the price level is above its target during period t-1, the target rate of inflation during period t is below π _ .
Substitute (3), (5) and (12) into the loss function (4) to yield
Rewriting (4'') for period t+1 and taking the expected value yields
While noting the dependence of p t+1 on R t+1 , taking the first derivative of (13) with respect to R t+1 and setting the result equal to zero yields t p t+1 = p _ t + π _ . This allows the equation for the IS curve to be written as
(1'')
) and (3) can be used to write the expected loss function for the current period as follows:
Inserting (14) into (1'') yields the expression for output demanded:
Solving (15) and (3) jointly for equilibrium output and the price level yields the results for pricelevel targeting.
(17)
Comparison of price-level and inflation targeting.
Under inflation targeting, the time t price level target is implicitly
This equation plus equations (5), (9), (10), (11) (16) and (17) can be used to find the deviations of output, the price level and inflation from their target values under both inflation and price level targeting. The results for inflation targeting are given in (18a-c).
The results for price level targeting are given in equations (19a-c).
Note that in (19c), we write π π − t rather than t t π π − . As pointed out by Svensson (1999) , the interesting issue is whether price level targeting performs better than inflation targeting, even in the case where society's preferences correspond to inflation targeting. Thus in (19c) we examine the deviation from a fixed inflation target. Table 1 provides a summary of the variances of these variables around their target values. Table 1 , the variance of output (about its full-information value), as well as the variance of the price level (about its target value) are always lower under price-level targeting than under inflation targeting. This contrasts with Svensson's (1999) results, where under both forms of targeting the variance of output is the same. It also contrasts with the conventional wisdom that price-level targeting increases the variance of output. The reason for the superiority of price-level targeting found here is that changes in expected inflation work to stabilize the economy through changes in the expected real rate of interest. This can be seen from Table 1 by noting that as α approaches zero, the variances of output and the price level under price-level targeting approach those under inflation targeting. Further intuition for this result is provided in the next section of the paper.
As pointed out in the introduction, the emerging conventional wisdom is that price-level targeting results in a higher variance in inflation than does inflation targeting. But as can be seen from the last column of Table 1 , here the comparison of inflation variance under the two regimes is ambiguous. It can easily be seen from the entries in the table that if α is large enough relative to γ, then the variance of inflation is lower under price-level targeting.
To obtain some intuition for this result note that α 1 − is the slope of the IS curve, while γ 1 is the slope of the AS curve. When the IS curve is relatively flat (α is relatively large), spending is highly responsive to changes in the real rate of interest. On the other hand, if the AS curve is relatively steep (γ is relatively small), changes in demand have a relatively large effect on the price level and therefore induce a relatively large change in expected inflation under price-level targeting. Hence as α increases relative to γ, the change in demand induced by price-level targeting and the resulting degree of built-in stability both increase. If the built-in stability induced by price level targeting is sufficiently large, then price level targeting also stabilizes the rate of inflation more than does inflation targeting. Thus, the IS curve shifts to the right to IS'. This increase in output demanded prevents the price level from declining as much as otherwise and allows output to increase in response to the temporary increase in aggregate supply. As a result, under price-level targeting both output and the price level stay closer to their optimal levels in response to supply shocks as well as in response to demand shocks. The superior performance of price level targeting when there is an aggregate supply shock depends in part on our assumption that the output target should reflect the current period supply shock. If this argument is correct, then the result discussed in Figure 2 will hold, even if the preferences of the monetary authority do not incorporate the contemporaneous supply shock. The reason is that the interest rate is set prior to observance of the supply shock. As a result, the monetary authority will optimally choose the same interest rate target, regardless of whether or not the output target in its loss function is adjusted to reflect the contemporaneous aggregate supply shock.
A Graphical Explanation
The above discussion of Figures 1 and 2 10. This is the loss function used by Taylor (1979) and Flodén (2000) among many others.
11. That is, Y 0 = c and P 0 = p _ t .
12. Equation (8), above, shows that if there is a fixed rate of interest, then output increases by the full amount of any demand shock under inflation targeting.
Original output is Y 0 , while original price level is P 0 . A shock to aggregate demand, given expected inflation shifts the IS curve to IS'. Since expected inflation does not change under inflation targeting, the new output and price level remain at Y π and P π . But if the monetary authority is targeting the price level, as the current price level increases expected inflation declines, causing the IS curve to shift back towards its original position to, say, IS''. As a result price level targeting reduces the variance (about their target values) of both output and the price level resulting from aggregate demand shocks. 
